1. Introduction 1.1. Congruency between powers and income for central and regional/local governments has to exist in every state. In many cases central government re ceives the greater part o f total government income, but regional/local govern ments spend the most o f it. Therefore total government income has to be shared and transfers from the central treasury to the regional/local ones have to take place. *) Dr. E.J.Ph.Roberts is a former Dutch diplomat with a career mainly in EC matter, lastly as a Director, head of the Directorate for European Integration, of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He defended his thesis on "the Power of the Purse" in the University of Leyden in 1996. At the moment he is working as a researcher in the University of Nijmegen. As a comparatist in public law he is concentrating on federal constructions with a special interest in intergovernmental financial relations. His e-mail adress is: edw_roberts@yahoo.com
In federal states the sharing o f government income cannot be arranged in the same way as in unitary ones. In a federal state central government has to respect the autonomous standing o f its component states. Sufficient income has to be guaranteed to these states so that they are able to exercise their powers in an autonomous way. In federal states the regulation o f the sharing of income and moneytransfers is part of constitutional law, in unitary states that regulation is part o f organic law. Attention will be given to the negotiations on this issue during the negotiations for the Single European Act (para. 6 ).
The introduction o f the concept led to the reform o f the structural Funds in 1988. This reform "coloured" the concept (para. 7). Further determination o f the concept took place by the European Council o f Maastricht (para. 's 8 and 9) which entailed the second reform o f the structural Funds in 1992 (para. 10).
Later reflections on the subject were marked by the pending enlargement o f the European Union by the adhesion of the less prosperous Central and Eastern European Countries and led to the third reform in 1999 (para.'s 11-12). The ex amination concludes with a summing up in 11 points (para. 13). The EAGGF/Guidance was mentioned in Part Two. Title II. Agriculture. Its aim was to support the realisation of the agricultural policy o f the EC. It would in an indirect way contribute to the Community's incomepolicy for the farming population which in first instance had to be guaranteed by the prices for agri cultural produce set by the Community.
The structural Funds at their beginning
So, the activities o f both Funds were limited to aims formulated in the chapters in which they had found their place.
2.2.
Already from the beginning the ESF had a larger budget than the EAGGF/Guidance. Both Funds were at that time separately financed by contri butions o f the Member States the amount of which was annually established by the Council of Ministers.
As regards the ESF a ceiling was established for the maximum amount of assis tance for each Member State.
In both Funds solidarity was practised: some member States received more than they contributed, others received less.
In the EAGGF/Guidance the key for the contributions was based on the share of a Member States' import o f agricultural produce in the total of such Community import.
In the ESF the contribution was decided on in conformity with the "contributive capacity" of each Member State and its readiness to assist Italy. In principle this readiness might be assumed to exist taking into account Protocol 8 These texts reflect an intertwining o f national and Community policy. The har monious development of the economy and the increase in the standard o f living are considered a national responsibility. However, the reduction of differences in the standard o f living is considered also to be a task for the Community.
Here may also be observed that in the Italy as well as in the Ireland Protocol the Community's financial assistance is supposed to flow to regions. So, parts of Member States are supposed to form rightly an object of concern in Commu nity policy. They fixed the total amount that might be spent by the ERDF over a period o f 3 years and they allocated a maximum amount of assistance for every Member State. Italy would benefit most, it would receive 40% of the amount, the UK 28%, France 15% and each o f the other Member States less than 10%. The allo cations were calculated in such a way that Italy , Ireland and the UK would be netto-receivers.
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
The EC Commission was content about these results o f the Conference. The es sential points in her proposals about this matter had been accepted, that is to say "a Fund with a general vocation as an instrument for Community policy" that would concentrate its activity on the least prosperous regions. Moreover, a ob noxious split between paying and receiving Member States was prevented be cause the netto-paying Member States had indeed recognised that the decision was o f importance for the European Community as such. These last two conditions caused that the ERDF money was mainly spent on projects selected and administered under national policy. Therefore, the Commission formulated in 1983 a general doctrine that the Funds had to be instruments o f economic development and adaptation, they were not to be just an instrument for the redistribution o f money. Moreover, the structural Funds had to be used for objectives which were to be laid down by the Community itself. The assistance had to be concentrated on the most seroiusly afflicted regions and according to the Community's priorities. In this way the expenditure of the Funds could also support other Community policies. To en hance its effect the percentages for co-financing had to be increased, they had to IGC (1985) preceding the Single European Act. The Committee fears that EMU leads to a widening of the cohesion gap. It stresses the importance of realising real convergence and sees the necessity of a redistribution scheme by which the more prosperous Member States will con tribute to the development of the least prosperous ones.
Review and improvement ofthe Funds
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12. Concentration is to be achieved by reducing the existing 6 objectives to only three.
Two of these objectives would have a regional character, that is objective 1 : the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, and objective 2 : economic and social conversion of areas facing struc tural difficulties. This last definition is more generous than the earlier objective 2 which only concerned areas in industrial decline.
The third objective focuses on the adaptation and the modernisation of national and European policies for employment, education and training. This funding will be available to all areas except those covered by objective 1.
The Commission asked for a strict application of the 75% (per capita)GDP limit in selecting the regions for funding under objective 1. As regards objective 2 a number of regions which received assistance earlier were to be removed from the list. For regions and Member States which would no longer be eligible for assistance a transitional assistance mechanism would be established. 
Malden, August 2000
